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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The value and significance of traditional knowledge (TK)1 has been widely recognized.
According to the study of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), TK has
tremendous merits in various respects, generating cultural, social, ecological, biological,
agricultural, and industrial values.2
In short, TK refers to the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities in the world. Yet there seems to be no definite and universally approved definition
of TK.3 The concept of TK may be reflected in the work of the WIPO, which outlines its general
scope as follows:
[T]he term “traditional knowledge” refers to the content or substance of
knowledge resulting from intellectual activity in a traditional context, and
includes the know-how, skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part
Professor of Law & Director, Institute of Technology Law, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan. Ph.D. in Law
(University of Edinburgh); LL.M. (University of California at Berkeley); LL.M. (National Taiwan Ocean
University); LL.B. (National Taiwan University). A preliminary version of this article was presented at the
“International Conference on Culture Diversity under International Trade Regimes: Policy and Practices,” organized
by the Asian Center for WTO and International Health Law and Policy, College of Law, National Taiwan University
in Taipei, Taiwan, on June 28-29, 2007. This research work was supported by a grant from the National Science
Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (NSC 97-2410-H-009-025-MY3-). The author thanks Jo Ting Fu and
Kai Chih Chang for their helpful assistance.
1
The alternative term of ‘Indigenous Knowledge’ has also been used for the description of this knowledge. See
CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT
BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 20 (2006); Suman Sahai, Indigenous Knowledge and Its Protection in
India, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 174
(Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003).
2
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and
Principles, Eighth Sess., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, Geneva, June 610, 2005, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 [hereinafter IGC Eighth Sess. Doc.]; IGC, The Protection of Traditional
Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, Ninth Sess., Geneva, Apr. 24-28, 2006, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, Revised Provisions for
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy Objectives and Core Principles, Annexes to both
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/5 and WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, I. Policy Objectives, Annex 3 (2006) [hereinafter WIPO DRAFT,
TK Objectives and Principles].
3
Peter Drahos, A Networked Responsive Regulatory Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A
TRIPS-PLUS ERA 396 (Daniel J. Gervais ed. 2007).
!
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of traditional knowledge systems, and knowledge embodying traditional lifestyles
of indigenous and local communities, or contained in codified knowledge systems
passed between generations.4
¶3

¶4

¶5

¶6

From an ownership perspective, TK could arguably be classified as a form of intellectual
property. In contrast to the normal entitlements of intellectual property that individuals normally
enjoy, however, the property elements of TK are quite unique. TK is generated collectively, and
processed and preserved by indigenous peoples or local communities.5 TK is thus distinctively
associated with a group of people who may regard their body of TK as being beyond that of a
personal or proprietary nature.
TK is often transmitted orally from generation to generation,6 and it typically is not
codified within any modern system of documentation. TK is also not limited to any precise form,
“tak[ing] the form of stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, beliefs, rituals,
community laws, local language, and agricultural practices, including the development of plant
species and animal breeds.”7 The uniquely communal sense in which TK is possessed might
estrange it from modern intellectual property rights.8
Due to TK’s conservation value, its preservation can make a great contribution to
sustainable development of biodiversity.9 Thus, such a robust body of law governing TK may
involve complex considerations of environmental, developmental and social elements.
Further, given the close linkages between TK and its holders, TK holders become the most
indispensable stakeholder in designing any legal structure concerning TK.10 Certainly, the
4

WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2, art. 3(2). Drahos considers the WIPO’s ‘open-ended,
inclusive approach to the subject matter of TK’ an adequate model. Drahos, supra note 3.
5
See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
One study shows that modern intellectual property rights systems, such as patents, copyright, trade secrets, and
trademarks seem not really available to TK holders, in spite of few national practices using intellectual property
rights for TK protection. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 100-09 (2004); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS
STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 225 (2007) (arguing that intellectual property rights are
inadequate for the protection of indigenous bio-diversity rights). Cf. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s
Hut to the Patent Office: A Road Under Construction, in BIODIVERSITY & THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 257-58 (Charles R. McManis ed. 2007) (indicating national
protection of TK by using existing IP systems); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to
Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 253 (2000) (speculating the feasibility of articulating
intellectual property rights over TK).
9
It is observed that TK “commonly refers to knowledge associated with the environment” DUTFIELD, supra note 8,
at 91. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that many indigenous and local communities that
are TK holders “have cultivated and used biological diversity in a sustainable way for thousands of years. Some of
their practices have been proven to enhance and promote biodiversity at the local level and aid in maintaining
healthy ecosystems.” Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5.
10
The instruments of WIPO and the U.N. on TK have addressed the needs of TK holders. See infra Part III. B. D.
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promotion and recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples will be instrumental in pressuring
national authorities to take necessary measures to protect TK, especially when such actions entail
the conclusion of binding treaties.11
As TK is created, applied, and preserved by local and indigenous communities, its
protection used to be a national or local matter and concern. Nonetheless, there are significant
reasons for the international community to pay due regard to TK protection as well, and there is a
growing global movement to promote the international status of indigenous peoples, who possess
most TK. For one, given its intrinsic value, the protection and preservation of TK benefits
humankind as a whole, and should accordingly be of interest to the international community. In
particular, because TK access and utilization has been exercised in boundary-crossing ways, the
theft of TK has been and should continue to be strongly intolerant to international society.
Misappropriation of TK has led to the granting of undesirable patents on inventions based
directly on TK related to local bio-diversity, resulting in a form of TK piracy.12
To date, the international community has responded to the issue of TK by formulating a
variety of documents with differential legal implications. The Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)13 appears to be the first international agreement that obliges State parties to
protect bio-related TK. The CBD has mandated the use of TK to comply with access and benefitsharing devices. After intense debate and study, the WIPO, based on a defensive approach, has
drafted an unprecedented instrument exclusively for the protection of TK. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) has been negotiating the relationship between its intellectual property
agreement, namely the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),14 and the CBD, in which a proposal to revise patent disclosure so as to add certain CBD
mandates has aroused heated debate.15 Following decades of effort, the General Assembly of the
United Nations has finally adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples16 in which
11

Drahos, supra note 3, at 393-94.
TK has been misappropriated occasionally without just cause, either through failure to gain the approval of the
holders of such knowledge, or failure to share any benefits with the holders. A number of infamous bio-piracy cases
not only refer to misappropriation of national genetic resources but also associated TK. For an illustration of piracy
on TK, see generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 65-67
(2000) (outlining patents on turmeric, neem and quinoa that were erroneously granted).
13
The Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force
Dec. 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
14
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999) [hereinafter TRIPS].
15
See generally Kuei-Jung Ni, The Incorporation of the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing into TRIPS
Regime: An Appraisal on the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic Resources, 1 ASIAN J. WTO &
INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 433, 446-54 (2006) (summarizing and analyzing the conflicting views and rational among
WTO members regarding the disclosure proposal).
16
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13,
2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. The U.N. Declaration was adopted by a majority of 143 states in favor, with 4
votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
12
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the rights of peoples regarding TK has been squarely recognized. The CBD, WIPO, and the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, all sub organs of the U.N., as well as the WTO,
have become the major contributors towards global TK lawmaking.17
This article aims to explore how these key global legal systems engage in the protection of
TK by formulating rules of either hard law or soft law. The study will preliminarily analyze the
legal implications and effect of those instruments. Part II examines the relevance of global
lawmaking to TK. Part III reviews the present global legal frameworks dealing with the
protection of TK. Then, Part IV assesses the feasibility of establishing a coherent and integrated
instrument for TK protection when individual international legal devices are presumed to be of
only limited function. Part V presents the conclusion.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF GLOBAL LAWMAKING TO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: WHY
INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS

¶10

As indicated above, TK is developed by local indigenous communities. Management of TK
was long a local matter. Yet, in recent years, the protection of TK has become a growing concern
in the international community. The achievement of the international endeavor to protect such
intellectual and cultural heritage may contribute to the welfare of human kind as a whole.
¶11
Apart from local peoples, TK has also been acquired and employed by foreign entities,
including foreign individuals, research academics, and multinational companies. The
transnational nature of modern TK use underscores the need to create legal frameworks to
regulate such transnational activities not only through national authorities but also through
international mechanisms as well.18 In addition, there has been an international movement to
promote and recognize the rights of indigenous peoples who hold most TK. TK protection can be
viewed as an imminent international matter, especially from the perspective of international
human rights.19
¶12
International lawmaking could be conducive to TK protection, if employed effectively.
With respect to crafting substantial international rules, relevant international institutions may
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See Office of the
United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). But, those four
objecting nations recently have shifted their position to support the declaration. See U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues website: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/news.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
17
These forums have often been noted by legal scholarship. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN,
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338-45 (2008); Carvalho, supra note 8; Drahos, supra note 3, at 385-86.
Nonetheless, apart from the above-mentioned regimes, there are other U.N. forums that also pay regard to the TK
issue, such as the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO). See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5.
18
As an aside, note that Professor Jessup’s notion of transnational law can be fairly applied to TK regulation. PHILIP
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
19
See infra Part III.D.
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engage in the negotiations regarding common conditions and standard-setting among States with
a view to providing either a minimal or basic level of protection or a strict universally applied
requirement. In pursuing the latter option, imposing clear obligations upon contracting parties
generates a legally binding force that makes the non-compliance of parties a serious matter.20
However, States are usually inclined to resist entering into binding agreements that might
deprive them of their discretion over protected matters. Accordingly, States may reach
compromise by opting instead for a minimum level of protection in the form of relatively weak
guidelines or recommendations.21 In spite of the soft law character of these non-binding
agreements, empirical studies have underlined their essential role in the international legal
system.22
¶13
In order to strengthen protection measures, international institutions have a wide range of
options available to them. First, international institutions can formulate enforcement mechanisms
to ensure national implementation of treaty obligations and to enforce compliance through rules
governing procedure and remedy. For example, the U.N. Security Council is empowered with
very strong enforcement authority by which coercive or non-coercive measures may be taken to
redress violations.23 The compliance system operative in the Montreal Protocol, which regulates
compliance with environmental regulations, also represents an effective model.24
¶14
Second, if no binding agreement or solid enforcement mechanism has yet been established,
international institutions may avail themselves of non-legally binding resolutions or
recommendations to persuade violators to correct their impermissible behavior.25 Ideally, a
20

PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERIN REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 245-46 (3d
ed. 2009).
21
See Bonn Guidelines infra Part III. A.3.a.
22
For a thorough study on the role of non-binding norms, including an environmental perspective, See generally
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
(Dinah Shelton et al. eds. 2000). Soft law instruments can constitute a dynamic part of the multilateral treaty-making
process. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-20 (2007).
23
U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42.
24
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16, 1987 [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]. In Annex IV of the Montreal Protocol, entitled “Non-compliance Procedure,” an Implementation
Committee was established in order to supervise the national implementation of the Protocol. According to
paragraph 9 of the Annex, the Committee shall report to the Meeting of Parties (MOP) of the Protocol, including any
recommendations it considers appropriate. Then, based upon the report, the Parties may decide upon and call for
necessary measures to enforce full compliance with the Protocol. In order to avoid controversy and to confine the
extent and content of the measures the Parties may take, Annex V of the Protocol sets up a list of available measures
in a straightforward manner. Apart from non-coercive and incentive means, in paragraph C of the Annex, suspension
of trade is clearly specified. See also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 246-48, 353-54.
25
For instance, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has
not yet built an enforceable compliance mechanism as effective as that of the Montreal Protocol. However, in
response to the trade on endangered rhinos and tigers during the mid-1990’s, CITES called upon contracting parties
to use trade restriction measures against countries that failed to obey its resolutions. Following the non-binding
resolutions, the U.S. soon invoked the Pelly Amendment to impose trade sanctions on Taiwan. For a description of
the episode, see Christine Crawford, Note, Conflicts Between the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species and the GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
555, 560-70 (1995).
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dispute settlement mechanism should be established to provide remedies for the breach of
obligations. The dispute settlement body of the WTO has been generally considered effective
and useful because it adopts compulsory jurisdiction and authorizes sanctions to make effective
its adjudications.26
¶15
Apart from the lawmaking process, international institutions often also engage in national
capacity building by providing technical and financial support and assisting in national
implementation of standards. Of course, international cooperation should be mandated or
encouraged, such as informational and technical exchanges and technology transfers.27
¶16
As mentioned, the use of TK frequently involves transnational actions of foreign entities. It
is difficult to deny the limits and probable deficiencies of international regulations on TK;
“international law based upon the regulation of state behavior is ill-equipped to respond to
corporate behavior, or that of other non-state actors.”28 It is uncertain to what extent the making
of TK-related international law may progress, and the effectiveness of these tools also remains to
be seen.29 Yet certainly the ongoing lawmaking process may provide an impetus for the
protection, preservation, and development of TK at the international level.
¶17
The following text will examine the present and ongoing lawmaking activities for TK
initiated by a variety of international institutions.
III. HOW DO THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO THE PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?30
A. The Convention on Biological Diversity
1. The Convention on Biological Diversity Context
¶18

Adopted in 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one of the most
prominent multilateral environmental agreements dealing with the conservation and sustainable
use of the earth’s biodiversity.31 TK, in a general sense, has played a significant role in
26

See infra Part III.C and accompanying text. Cf. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 250 (noting unsatisfactory
resolution of disputes by the WTO mechanism).
27
See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1037-43 (2d ed. 2003).
28
BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 21.
29
Experts have cautioned that treaties on TK may turn out to be ‘dead letters’ if they fail to coordinate the
enforcement of existing norms. See Drahos, supra note 3, at 386-87.
30
The current status of international legal instruments on the protection of traditional knowledge is elaborated in
Annex I, infra.
31
Apart from the CBD, there are other multilateral environmental agreements relevant to the conservation of
wildlife, such as the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention); the 1972
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention); the 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); and the 1979
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention). BIRNIE ET AL., supra
note 20, at 652.
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contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of this biodiversity.32 In its preamble, the
CBD recognizes indigenous and local peoples’ close and traditional dependence on biological
resources. In its text, the CBD places the preservation of bio-related TK as one of the contracting
parties’ obligations under the “In-situ Conservation” of Article 8. Article 8(j) provides that every
State Party shall:
Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge,
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices.33
¶19

Thus, State Parties’ obligations under Article 8(j) include three aspects. First, each Party is
required to preserve TK in its territories. Second, the CBD respects the rights of TK holders to
the extent that the utilization of TK is not allowed without the approval of TK holders. Third,
any contracting Party to the CBD is expected to formulate a system to ensure that TK holders
enjoy the benefits that flow from the utilization of their TK. The first element is derived from a
conservation perspective. The latter two mandates are designated to oblige Parties to establish
suitable legal regimes upon which the application and benefit-sharing of TK can be fairly
managed.
¶20
Irrespective of CBD’s resolve to protect TK and its holders, the normative binding force on
Parties seems tenuous. The mandate on States under Article 8(j) is “subject to its national
legislation,” which may result in multiple interpretations and outcomes. One commentator seems
not to worry about the problem of this expression, arguing that the usage “was included in order
to protect the existing relationships between some States and their indigenous populations, and
should not be interpreted as affording each Contracting Party discretion as whether or not to
implement the provision.”34 Others argue, however, that obligations under Article 8(j) are
eviscerated by inserting this phrase; arguably, national law, to some extent, may prevail over the
CBD mandate.35 Moreover, opening passage of Article 8 qualifies this “mandate” by including
the phrase “as far as possible and as appropriate.”
32

See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5.
CBD, supra note 13, art. 8(j).
34
Michael I. Jeffery, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing under the Convention on
Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747, 782 (2002).
35
Aguilar considers the commitment of Art. 8(j) weak, contending that “without national legislation to implement
33
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In addition to Article 8(j), the CBD includes other provisions related to the protection of
TK. Article 10(c), which deals with sustainable use of TK on biodiversity, requires States to
“protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional
cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements.”36
According to the CBD section concerning ‘Exchange of Information,’ indigenous and traditional
knowledge is explicitly placed in the category of information to be exchanged.37 On the
deployment of techniques to facilitate the fulfillment of the CBD objectives, such as ‘Technical
and Scientific Cooperation,’ Article 18 requires parties to engage in cooperation for the
development of technologies, which includes the aspect of TK.38 Lastly, it is evident that certain
TK has been misappropriated, and then exploited to obtain intellectual property rights. Thus, TK
issues should be covered by the CBD’s work to reconcile the protection of intellectual property
rights with CBD’s objectives.39
2. The Conference of the Parties and the Working Group on Article 8(j)

¶22

Regardless of CBD provisions that set out lofty goals to protect TK and to promote the
interests of TK holders, the treaty’s effectiveness hinges largely on the willingness and ability of
States to perform their duties. The Conference of the Parties (COP), as the supreme decisionmaking body of the CBD, is competent to monitor the implementation of the Convention.40 In
addition, the COP also plays a significant role in assisting Contracting Parties to carry out their
obligations. To fulfill the mandate, the COP shall “[e]stablish such subsidiary bodies,
particularly to provide scientific and technical advice, as are deemed necessary for the
implementation of this Convention.”41 At its fourth annual meeting, the COP, in decision IV/9,
established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Inter-sessional Working Group to address the
implementation of Article 8(j) and related provisions.42
the article, this is merely an expression of goodwill.” Grethel Aguilar, Access to Genetic Resources and Protection
of Traditional Knowledge in Indigenous Territories, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON
TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 176 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003).
36
CBD, supra note 13, art. 10(c).
37
Id. art. 17(2).
38
Id. art. 18(4). It is argued that the inclusion of TK into the broader range of “technologies” in the CBD means that
“there is no justification for assuming (as many tend to do) that such technologies have a lower status than other
technologies relevant to the Convention; nor should they be any less morally entitled to legal protection.” GRAHAM
DUFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 35 (2000).
39
Article 16(5) of the CBD provides, “The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual
property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this regard
subject to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not
run counter to its objectives.” CBD, supra note 13, art. 16(5).
40
CBD, supra note 13, art. 23(4).
41
Id. art. 23(4)(g).
42
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Fourth Meeting, Bratislava, Slovakia, May 4-15, 1998, COP Decision IV/9, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/4/20, Annex 1 (1998), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-04-dec-en.pdf
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¶23

The primary mission of this working group is to provide the COP with advice relating to
the implementation of such provisions.43 Based on the structure of the elements proposed in the
Madrid workshop report,44 the Working Group formulated a programme of work on Article 8(j),
which was subsequently adopted at the COP-5 in May 2000.45
¶24
The programme of work aims to help Parties fulfill their commitments under Article 8(j) by
highlighting a number of elements under which further specific tasks are listed. The programme
constitutes a blueprint for the implementation of TK protection within the CBD context. First of
all, considering the indispensable role of indigenous peoples and local communities in TK
protection, the work programme places the full and effective participation of those groups at all
stages and levels of its implementation as its key objective.46
¶25
Secondly, the programme initiated the study and survey of status and trends of TK in
question. Shortly thereafter, in 2002, an outline of a composite report was endorsed at the COP6.47 In the report, the Working Group was requested to explore the possibility of developing
technical guidelines for recording and documenting TK, and to analyze the potential threats
posed by documentation to the rights of TK holders.48 Further, in order to facilitate and assist
Parties and governments in the fulfillment of their commitments under Article 8(j) and related
provisions, the Working Group has been assigned to engage in the elaboration of several sets of
guidelines.49
[hereinafter COP decision IV/9].
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, May 15-26, 2000, Programme of Work on the
Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex to COP
Decision V/16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, Annex III, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop05/full/cop-05-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Programme of Work ].
46
Id. at 143. The COP has continuously encouraged Parties to include TK holders in their delegations for the
Working Group to promote consultations among the groups on issues covered by the Working Group. See COP
decision IV/9, supra note 42, ¶¶ 3, 4, 12; Programme of Work, supra note 45, ¶¶ 5, 18. Recently, the COP at its
ninth meeting paid more attention on the “participatory mechanisms for indigenous and local communities in the
Convention.” The Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn,
Ger., May 19-30, 2008, COP Decision IX/13E, at 67-68, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008),
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf.
47
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Outline of a Composite Report on the
Status and Trends regarding Knowledge, Innovations and Practices of Indigenous and Local Communities relevant
for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, and the Plan and Timetable for its Preparation,
Annex I to COP Decision VI/10, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop06/full/cop-06-dec-en.pdf.
48
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Eighth Meeting, Curitiba, Braz., Mar. 20-31, 2006, COP Decision VIII/5BI, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-08- dec-en.pdf.
49
See Programme of Work, supra note 45, at 145-46, Element 3, Task 6, 13, 14, 15 at 145-46 (including the respect,
preservation, and maintenance of TK; efforts to strengthen the use of TK; the establishment of national incentive
schemes for indigenous peoples to preserve and maintain their TK and for the application of such TK; and the
facilitation of repatriation of TK information).
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¶26

Thirdly, with respect to regulations to ensure fair TK access, one of the focal points of the
programme has been the development of guidelines to ensure the utilization of TK with the
consent of the holders and to ensure they can obtain an equitable share of benefits arising from
the utilization.50 To effectively protect such interests, the Article 8(j) Working Group’s
programme emphasizes prevention measures regarding the misappropriation of TK.51
¶27
In practice, many States have adopted specific laws to implement the programme of work
on Article 8(j). For instance, Peruvian law requires that people who are interested in having
access to the knowledge must apply for the prior informed consent of TK holders.52 In an effort
to document TK, Peruvian law also initiates systems of registration of TK.53
¶28
The more recent and prominent progress and achievement of the CBD lawmaking on
Article 8(j) are found in the drafting of a text on “elements of a code of ethical conduct,” which
were finally adopted at COP-10 in 2010.54 The elements of the code are designed to provide
guidance to assist Parties in building their national legal frameworks to fulfill their commitments
on respect, preservation, and maintenance of TK.55
¶29
The context of the code elaborates and expands the original TK protection mandate
enunciated in Article 8(j). The document manages to cover any activities and interactions with
indigenous and local communities that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity.56 Further, regarding the place where the activities are operative, and
considering the integral connection between TK and the environment where they traditionally
exist, the code specifies that the geographic coverage of protection may extend to sacred sites,
culturally significant sites, and lands and waters in which such activities may occur.57

50

Id. at 144, Element 4, Task 7.
Id. at 146, Element 6, Task 10.
52
Ley N° 27811, art. 6 del 24 de julio de 2002, mediante la cual se establece el régimen de protección de los
conocimientos colectivos de los pueblos indígenas vinculados a los recursos biológicos (Peru) [Law N° 27811, art.
6. of July 24, 2002] [Law Establishing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples
Derived from Biological Resources], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3420 [hereinafter
Peruvian Law N° 27811].
53
Id. arts. 15-24.
54
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18-29, 2010, The Tkarihwaieri Code of Ethical
Conduct on Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Annex to COP Decision X/42, at 3, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/42 (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-42en.pdf [hereinafter Code of Ethical Conduct]. For a previous draft of the code, see Convention on Biological
Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth
Meeting, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, Draft Elements of A Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the
Cultural and Intellectual Heritage Indigenous and Local Communities Relevant to the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Annex to COP Decision IX/13G, at 70, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29
(June 30, 2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf.
55
Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54, ¶ 3.
56
See id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
57
Id. ¶¶ 3, 17.
51
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¶30

The major part of the code underlines several ethical principles applicable to the activities
and interactions in questions. Some of them tend to confirm the privileges of indigenous peoples,
although the passage carefully avoids using terms that indicate group rights. The privileges
consist of claims on intellectual property relevant to TK, the right to know (keeping the operation
of the activities transparency), the right to give prior informed consent, and the right to claim
benefit-sharing.58 As the term ‘rights’ has yet to be clearly specified in Article 8(j),59 other
principles underline the burdens imposed on entities engaging in relevant activities, without
producing concrete commitments regarding TK protection.60
¶31
More importantly, apart from delivering general ethical principles, the code also provides
‘specific consideration,’ which arguably incorporates human rights aspects under the rubric of
TK protection. The approach clearly indicates the attempt to link TK protection to certain
indigenous peoples’ human rights which have already been promoted by other instruments of
international human rights,61 such as recognition of rights to lands and waters occupied or used
by indigenous peoples, rights to traditional resources, and the right not to be removed.62
¶32
Indeed, the code emphasizes that it “should not be construed as altering or interpreting the
obligations of Parties to the Convention . . .”63 Such inclusion appears to be an indication of
minimizing the legal effect of the document. Nevertheless, when viewing the document as a
whole, its elaboration and amplification of the original mandate of TK protection specified in the
wording of Article 8(j) is simply in line with the usual model developed in the lawmaking
process of multilateral treaties.64
3. Protection of Genetic Resources and the Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime
i)

The Bonn Guidelines’ Device on TK
¶33
One of the objectives of the CBD aims to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising out of the utilization of biodiversity resources,65 especially genetic resources.66 The goal
reflects grave concerns over the protection of genetic resource-providing countries from the
58

Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11, 14. In paragraph 11, the terms “prior informed consent (PIC)” and/or “Approval and
Involvement” of TK holders are placed together.
59
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 627.
60
E.g., Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54, ¶¶ 7, 12, 15.
61
Id. ¶ 17. For instance, ILO 169’s standard and the recent U.N. Declaration touch on the land rights of indigenous
peoples and carry similar implications to that of the CBD Code.
62
Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 19.
63
Id. ¶ 1.
64
It is not uncommon that a soft law form of an instrument delivered after a previously concluded treaty may
constitute a tool of interpretation for provisions of treaties. See generally BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 21617.
65
CBD, supra note 13, art. 1.
66
CBD defines genetic resources as genetic material of actual or potential value. Id. art. 2.
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unauthorized, uncompensated activities of bioprospectors, particularly bio-piracy.67 Article 15 of
the CBD provides the basic elements upon which State Parties may establish their access regimes
for genetic resources. This provision first confers upon States sovereign rights over the
resources, so that States have the authority to regulate access to their genetic resources.68 More
importantly, the law requires that any Party wanting such access must obtain Prior and Informed
Consent from Parties and also mandates the sharing of benefits arising from authorized genetic
resource bioprospecting, which is based upon mutually agreed upon terms.69
¶34
Since the inception of the CBD regime, contracting parties have attempted to build the
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) regime. Meanwhile, many of them require capacity building
and technical support for the construction of their related legal and administrative frameworks.
The CBD thus established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit
Sharing (ABS) in an attempt to facilitate parties’ implementation of Article 15 and related
provisions.70 In 2002, at its sixth meeting, the COP, in decision VI/24, adopted the work prepared
by the Working Group in this regard, namely the “Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization.”71
¶35
Apart from genetic resources, the Guidelines extend the ABS elements to cover associated
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices.72 Thus, access to national genetic resourcerelated TK and its benefit-sharing could be guided by the Bonn instrument.73 Of course, the Bonn
Guidelines specify a number of guiding principles for TK in each sector.
¶36
For instance, competent national authorities are expected to provide advice on a
“mechanism for the effective participation of indigenous and local communities.”74 The users of
TK should “respect customs, traditions, values, and customary practices of indigenous and local
communities.”75 State Parties, who discover that genetic resource users are under their
67

For a description of bio-piracy on bio-resources, see DUTFIELD, supra note 8, at 52-59; Jeffery, supra note 34, at
757, n.53. For the genetic recourses-providing countries’ attempt to revoke undesirable patents obtained by biopiracy, see also Ni, supra note 15, at 437-38.
68
CBD, supra note 13, art. 15(1).
69
Id. art. 15(5)(7).
70
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, May 15-26, 2000, Annex III to COP Decision V/26A, at
197, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-05-dec-en.pdf
[hereinafter CBD COP-V decision].
71
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, Annex to COP Decision
VI/24A, at 263, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-06-decen.pdf [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines].
72
Id. ¶ 9.
73
Given the relevance of the Bonn Guidelines to the work of the Working Group on Article 8(j), the COP requests
the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions to consider the Guidelines as
relevant to its ongoing work. See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, at 263.
74
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, ¶ 14(g).
75
Id. ¶ 16(b)(ii).
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jurisdiction, “could” consider adopting measures to encourage the disclosure of the origin of TK
while applying for intellectual property rights.76 In accessing biodiversity-related TK, the prior
informed consent of TK holders should be obtained in accordance with their traditional practices,
national access policies, and subject to domestic laws.77 With regards to the mutually agreed
upon terms between users and providers, the Guidelines provide an indicative list of typical
terms, including “whether relevant TK has been respected, preserved and maintained, and
whether the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has
been protected and encouraged.”78
¶37
The practice of some developing countries hosting TK has been consistent with the Bonn
Guidelines. In Brazil, applicants for intellectual property rights must disclose the origin of the
genetic material and the associated traditional knowledge.79 This is distinct from the Peruvian
practice regarding the requirement of prior informed consent mentioned above.
¶38
Although the informative and detailed Guidelines have contributed greatly to the field, the
instrument remains a voluntary commitment, rather than a binding obligation.80 In effect, the
Guidelines give Parties much discretion in managing access to genetic resource-associated TK
without undertaking real international obligations.
ii) The Nagoya Protocol’s Device on TK
¶39
Responding to the call of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development,81 the CBD
has been engaging in the elaboration and negotiation of an international regime with a view to
strengthening the enforcement of ABS requirements under the CBD.82 A preliminary draft on the
regime was formulated and revealed at the eighth meeting of the COP in 2006.83 According to
the draft, the scope of the international regime is in line with the Bonn Guidelines and applies

76

Id. ¶ 16(d)(ii).
Id. ¶ 31.
78
Id. ¶ 44(g).
79
Provisional Measure No. 2.186-16, art. 31, Braz., Aug. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.grain.org/brl/?docid=850&lawid=1768.
80
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 71, ¶ 7.
81
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit
on Sustainable Development, ¶ 42(o), adopted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, at 139 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf.
82
See CBD website, International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing, http://www.cbd.int/ abs/regime.shtml
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011). For a general overview of the CBD’s lawmaking progress on international regimes see
Kuei-Jung Ni, Legal Aspects of Prior Informed Consent on Access to Genetic Resources: An Analysis of Global and
Local Implementation towards an Optimal Normative Construction, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 227, 242-50
(2009).
83
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Eighth Meeting, Curitiba, Brazil, Mar. 20-31, 2006, International Regime on Access and
Benefit-Sharing, Annex to COP Decision VIII/4A, at 53, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (June 15, 2006),
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-08- dec-en.pdf.
77
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both to genetic resources and associated TK. The draft clearly seeks to enforce the interests of
TK holders.
¶40
In effect, the 2006 draft proposes to contain measures to ensure compliance with the prior
informed consent of TK holders.84 The inclusion of measures to prevent misappropriation and
unauthorized access and use of TK is also under deliberation.85 The draft further requires that
Parties take enforcement measures, such as sanctions, to prevent uses of TK that fail to comply
with provisions of the international regime.86
¶41
At its ninth meeting in 2008, the COP adopted a more detailed agenda on the negotiations
of the international regime.87 Regarding the protection of TK in the context of the ABS system,
the agenda provides components to be negotiated, which fulfill and elaborate the mandate of
ABS disclosed in Article 8(j). However, it should be noted that Article 8(j) actually does not use
identical terms as those in Article 15 of the CBD.88 To expand and apply the ABS regime
originating in Article 15 to cover TK protection requires further study and political will. In order
to assist the ABS Working Group, the COP decided to establish a group of technical and legal
experts on genetic resource-related TK to study and examine relevant issues, such as the
definition of associated TK, the applicability of ABS in Article 15 to TK and the legal basis of
prior informed consent for TK holders.89
¶42
The result of the seventh meeting of the Working Group on ABS reveals more specific
elements on TK’s ABS device,90 which elaborates and amplifies Article 8(j) and the Bonn
Guidelines in this regard. It manages to define clearly the rights and obligations of both TK
holders and national authorities. The draft tends to promote the status of indigenous and local
communities with regard to TK access by confirming their right to be consulted by authorities,
including on the matters of prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms in benefit-sharing, and
effective participation.91 To allow them to actively and meaningfully engage, Parties hosting TK

84

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
86
Id.
87
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Ninth Meeting, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, International Regime, Annex I to COP
Decision IX/12, at 53, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Biological Diversity Ninth Mtg].
88
For instance, the CBD prior informed consent requirement of Art. 15 is not specified in Art. 8(j).
89
Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn, Ger., May 19-30, 2008, Terms of Reference of the Expert Groups
Established in Paragraph 11 of Decision IX/12, Annex IIC to COP Decision IX/12, at 61, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf.
90
Convention on Biological Diversity, Paris, Fr., Apr. 2-8, 2009, Report of the Seventh Mtg. of the Ad Hoc Openended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/8, Annex, at 21 (May 5,
2009), http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-07/official/abswg-07-08-en.pdf.
91
Id. at 31-32.
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are required to provide capacity building, to ensure appropriate participation, and to provide
assistance in giving prior informed consent and forming mutually agreed terms.92
¶43
At the eighth meeting of the Working Group on ABS, under the insistence and advocacy of
genetic resource-rich countries, an agenda to negotiate a binding protocol for the international
regime prevailed.93 Meanwhile, more draft texts to uphold the rights of TK holders in ABS
continued to be produced.94
¶44
At the last ABS working group meeting prior to the COP-10, a revised draft protocol on
ABS was then formulated in the form of a treaty.95 The draft largely reflects the genuine
expectations of indigenous and local communities by requiring TK hosting Parties to grant TK
holders the right to prior informed consent and benefit-sharing while genetic resource-related TK
is accessed and utilized.96 Parties’ obligation to support capacity building for TK holders has also
been confirmed.97 However, some phrases are still subject to deliberation and final approval.
Moreover, Parties’ obligations, such as those concerning TK access, are to some extent also
weakened by the addition of compromising language, such as “with the aim of” and “as
appropriate.”98
¶45
At its tenth meeting, held in Japan in October 2011, the COP eventually adopted the
Nagoya Protocol on ABS99 to finalize the six years of negotiation for creating an international
ABS regime. Most elements concerning TK that were negotiated in the previous drafts have been
reflected in the Protocol. As such, the treaty seems to oblige both TK hosting and user countries
to ensure that TK holders’ rights to benefit-sharing and prior informed consent are enforced.
However, the obligatory level of certain items remains deferential. For instance, each Party’s
obligation to fulfill TK holders’ entitlement to share benefits is abated by inserting “as
appropriate.”100 Furthermore, with respect to TK access, indigenous groups’ exercise of prior
informed consent rights must be in accordance with domestic law.101 In other words, Parties’
92

Id. at 32-33.
Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, Can., Nov. 9-15, 2009, Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc
Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, ¶¶ 32, 49, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/8 (Nov.
20, 2009), http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-08/official/abswg-08-08-en.pdf.
94
Id. Annex I.
95
Convention on Biological Diversity, Cali, Colom, Mar. 22-28, 2010, The Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Openended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/CRP.1, Annex I (Mar.
25, 2009).
96
Id. art. 4, ¶ 4; art. 5.
97
Id. art. 9, ¶ 3 (Parties are required to support the development of community protocols, minimum requirements
and model contractual clauses on ABS); art. 18, ¶ 3.
98
Id. art. 4, ¶ 4; art. 5.
99
Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18-29, 2010, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, COP Decision X/1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, Annex I, at 5 (Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-10-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].
100
Id. art. 5(5).
101
Id. art. 7.
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obligation to enforce prior informed consent rights of TK holders hinges on whether domestic
law affirms such a right. Without such domestic law, no Party would be held responsible for
treaty violation. Such an arrangement indicates the unwillingness of Parties, at the current stage,
to allow the new treaty to change their national level of protection for TK holders.
¶46
The Nagoya Protocol will remain open for signature by Parties to the Convention from
February 2, 2011 until February 1, 2012, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
Because the Protocol is still in the signature stage, it remains to be seen how many countries
ultimately ratify the protocol and what effect it will have on international TK protection. What is
clear is that, without changes in domestic law, the Protocol has not yet established a strong
mandate to require Parties to observe ABS elements for TK holders below the international level.
4. Reflection and Comments on the CBD’s Progress
¶47

Presently, it may be safe to say that the CBD is the most dynamic international legal system
for promoting the protection of TK, although its mandate is confined to the context of
biodiversity-related areas. In effect, the regime constitutes one of the most significant
international institutions that pay due regard to TK holders. While no precise and definite
obligations of Parties are specified in Article 8(j) of the CBD in terms of TK preservation, it
remains to be seen how nations may seriously implement Article 8(j) in its broader sense.
Nonetheless, while recognizing the indispensable role of TK holders in the fulfillment of the
mandate of Article 8(j), the CBD’s continuous efforts to make indigenous peoples and local
communities involved in relevant lawmaking and deliberation processes cannot be
underestimated.102
¶48
The CBD has finished a preliminary study and survey on the status of TK and proposed
certain means for its preservation, such as documentation of TK. Currently, at least one soft law
character of guidance in assisting implementation has been formulated and adopted.103
¶49
Indeed, the current work of guidelines and principles is not of a binding nature, but is
instead voluntary. Nonetheless, as observed, some international soft law instruments do go
beyond the status of a simply non-binding force and may be transformed into binding form while
having dynamic interaction with related treaty regimes.104 It would thus be premature to predict
how far the Working Group’s efforts on Article 8(j) may go in terms of influencing national TK

102

It is submitted that the CBD “will provide the forum within which such communities can participate and thus
influence the parties when developing policies, guidelines or protocols impinging upon their interests…” BIRNIE ET
AL., supra note 20, at 628.
103
Code of Ethical Conduct, supra note 54.
104
For an explanation on how soft law instruments interact with treaty regimes and how the law goes beyond nonbinding force, see generally BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 216.
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policy. However, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, some developing countries have
already begun implementing such instruments.
¶50
The attempt to formulate a code of ethical conduct is an indication of the CBD’s broader
perspective on TK protection, which is not limited to the knowledge itself, but manages to
extend to the geographic and ecological environment where TK originates and develops. The
move should be justifiable and desirable given the close and inalienable linkage between them.
In particular, the incorporation of a human rights approach for TK protection could further the
legal status of TK holders and safeguard TK from undesirable activities. Thus, in contrast to
some observations,105 the progress of TK working groups has actually moved towards the
clarification of the rights of TK holders, in spite of its voluntary nature.
¶51
Apart from calling for the submission of national reports regarding Parties’
implementation, the CBD on Article 8(j) makes little progress with respect to monitoring
mechanisms. Given the weak commitments imposed on Parties in this regard, at the current stage
it would be politically infeasible to incorporate any compliance mechanism from the perspective
of TK preservation into the CBD framework. Nevertheless, despite lacking real teeth, the CBD
COP/Working Group on Article 8(j) can regularly keep Parties informed of the significance of
TK protection by signaling international concern at all levels of the CBD forums.
¶52
On the other hand, relatively visible progress has been made concerning the ABS
mechanism that has covered bio-related TK, evidenced in the Bonn Guidelines and the newly
adopted Nagoya Protocol on ABS. As indicated above, the soft law character of the Bonn
Guidelines may weaken their effectiveness. Attempts to establish an ABS treaty regime do
demonstrate the CBD’s resolve to enforce one of its objectives on a global basis. In terms of
obliging Parties to protect TK in the context of ABS, the eventual establishment of the Nagoya
Protocol may be a repetition of an episode on how a soft approach of the Bonn Guidelines can be
transformed into a more consolidated form.106 The new treaty does expand the realm of ABS to
include TK protection. As indicated above, however, the Parties’ commitment on international
level remains uncertain due to the wide margin of national discretion. Thus, in spite of its legally
binding form, it remains to be observed whether and to what extent the newly developed ABS
treaty regime, in the form of the Nagoya Protocol, may make substantial contribution to TK
enforcement after its inception.107

105

Some scholars are not convinced that presently “the COP will provide the vehicle for further clarification of
indigenous and local communities’ rights.” BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 628.
106
For instance, the binding form of non-compliance procedure set in the Montreal Protocol is preceded by a nonbinding resolution. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 218.
107
According to Art. 30 of the Nagoya Protocol, the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol would adopt procedures
and mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 99, art. 30.
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Furthermore, irrespective of its non-intellectual property rights treaty nature, the CBD
appears to call on other intellectual property rights-related international institutions, such as the
WIPO and WTO, to pay due regard to the protection of biodiversity-related TK in terms of
property rights.108 Particularly in light of this push for multilateral approaches to TK protection,
the CBD has become pivotal in initiating and promoting TK protection amongst relevant
international legal regimes.
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization
1. Background

¶54

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations that supervises global intellectual property treaties, appears to be relatively attentive to
the grave concern of the CBD regarding the impact of intellectual property rights on the
implementation of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) system. At its sixth meeting, the COP to
the CBD in 2002 adopted a decision on the “Role of intellectual property rights in the
implementation of access and benefit-sharing arrangements.”109 With respect to the issue of TK
protection, Parties are invited to encourage the disclosure of the origin of bio-related TK. The
COP has signaled that TK-related intellectual property rights fall under the competence of other
international institutions, such as the WIPO. It thus invited WIPO to prepare a technical study on
disclosure requirements of associated TK and its sources, where they are utilized in the
development of the claimed inventions.110 The WIPO was also encouraged Parties to consider
means by which they could collaborate to protect TK.111
¶55
In 2000, in response to the increasing global concern over the impact of intellectual
property rights on the protection of genetic resources, TK, and traditional cultural expressions,
WIPO established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). Since then, especially with the CBD’s
urging, the IGC has been conducting a substantial and comprehensive study on the legal and
policy options for the protection of TK.112 The task involves “analyses of existing national and
108

See notes 105-07 infra and accompanying text. CBD/COP Decision X/1, I: Adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, ¶ 6,
at 3.
109
Convention on Biological Diversity, The Hague, Apr. 7-19, 2002, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, Annex I,
at 284, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP-06- dec-en.pdf.
110
Id. ¶ 4.
111
Id. ¶ 10.
112
The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Ninth Sess., Apr. 24-28, 2006,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, ¶ 1 (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter IGC Ninth Sess. Doc.]. IGC reviewed then existing sui generis
TK laws during its fifth session in July 2003. See WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/6 and
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/7.
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regional legal mechanisms, certain core elements of TK protection, cases studies, ongoing
surveys of international policy and law as well as certain previously supported key principles and
objectives of TK protection.”113
¶56
From an intellectual property perspective, the WIPO considers TK protection as
comprising both defensive and proactive approaches.114 After an extensive review on legal and
policy options, the IGC, at its eighth session in 2005, finalized a document, entitled “Draft
Provisions for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy Objectives and Core
Principles.”115 Instead of creating positive rights for TK holders, the instrument is confined to
deterring the illicit uses and misappropriations of TK.116 The draft includes three parts: Policy
Objectives, Guiding Principles and Substantive Provisions.
2. The Implications of the Draft Objectives and Principles on TK Protection
i) Overview
¶57
The Policy Objectives underline “common general directions for [TK] protection and
provide a consistent policy framework.”117 Despite its presumed status of a preamble118 that
normally lacks definite legal configuration, this sector delivers significant messages on TK
protection. The value of TK recognized in the task appears to be fairly extensive and holistic.119
More importantly, the Policy Objectives indicate the goal of recognizing and promoting the
status of TK holders, which makes the WIPO work one of the most attentive international
instruments for the interest of TK holders. Furthermore, given that the ABS initialed by the CBD
has been considered to be an effective tool against the illicit use of genetic resources and
associated knowledge, the Policy Objectives are intended to incorporate the CBD mandates into
its text, such as prior informed consent and benefit-sharing.120 To deter the erroneous grant of
intellectual property rights over TK to unauthorized parties, the Objectives expect patent

113

IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 1.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Traditional Knowledge, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk (last visited Nov.
3, 2011).
115
See WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2.
116
IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 5; Reproduction of Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 “The Protection of
Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles,” Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Twelfth Sess., Feb. 25-29, 2008, ¶ 18,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/12/5(c) (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter IGC Twelfth Sess. Doc.]; In the earlier sessions of IGC,
discussion focused more on defensive protection with a view toward the prevention of illegal granting of intellectual
property rights, which covered the proposal on disclosure of origin of TK. See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra
note 17, at 342.
117
IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 4(i).
118
IGC Eighth Sess. Doc., supra note 2, Annex, at 6.
119
Id. at 3.
120
Id. at 4.
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applicants to disclose the country of origin of TK, as well as the evidence of compliance with
prior informed consent and benefit-sharing arrangements required by the country of origin.121
¶58
General Guiding Principles are designed to “ensure that the substantive provisions
concerning protection are equitable, balanced, effective and consistent, and appropriately
promote the objectives of protection.”122
¶59
Several Guiding Principles do invoke a mandate to address the needs and rights of TK
holders.123 Also, certain elements of ABS have been confirmed as part of the Principles.124 The
inclusion of the ABS elements simply reflects the harmonization with the CBD mandate that
confers national authority to regulate the matter in this regard.125 In particular, the Principles
declare that the rights of TK holders should be recognized and respected. While the CBD has not
yet endorsed the “rights” of TK holders, the WIPO’s design represents remarkable progress in
this direction. Nevertheless, according to the commentary on the Principles, such rights would
not be on a comprehensive basis. Rather, the rights seem to be narrowed to a defensive nature,
which are applied only to the protection against misappropriation.126 The principle of recognizing
the specific characteristics of TK (traditional, collective or communal, inter-generational and
constantly evolving) is specified.127 The capacity building for TK holders is of grave concern to
the WIPO task.128
ii) Legal Framework
¶60
Arguably the most important contribution of the draft to TK protection is the formation of a
set of substantive provisions that are largely legal in nature. The draft provisions consist of
fourteen articles that constitute a systematic legal framework for the protection of TK.
¶61
As mentioned, it is not the intention of the IGC to adopt a positive-rights approach toward
TK protection. Thus, no exclusive or monopolistic property rights are created for TK.129 Article 1
explicitly declares that the protection is limited to rights against misappropriation or misuse.
Respecting existing national legal systems concerning TK protection, Article 2 gives nations
much discretion and flexibility regarding the legal form of protection.130

121

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 8.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 10-11.
126
Id. at 9. See also the discussion of Peruvian legislation, infra note 147 and accompanying text, for an example of
how prior informed consent and benefit sharing should be implemented to prevent misappropriation.
127
Id. at 11.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 14.
130
Id. at 17.
122
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Articles 3 to 5 tend to clarify the realm of both TK and its holders. Given the diverse
definitions and scope of TK in national legal systems, Article 3, titled “General Scope of Subject
Matter,” “does not seek to apply one singular and exhaustive definition” of TK.131 Rather, it
simply underlines a general description and then an illustrative list of elements within the scope
of TK.132 “Eligibility for the protection,” specified in Article 4, manages to propose what
qualities TK should have, mainly: (i) a traditional, intergenerational character; (ii) a distinctive
association with its traditional holders; and (iii) a sense of linkage with the identity of the TK
holding community.133 Article 5 defines which TK holders are entitled to such protection. The
beneficiaries comprise the indigenous and traditional communities that generate, preserve and
transmit the knowledge, or individuals within these communities and peoples.134
¶63
Articles 6 and 7 incorporate the mandate of ABS that has been adopted and implemented
within the CBD and many national regimes.135 Article 8 provides exceptions and limitations to
the TK protection with a view to reconciling with public interests and policy.136 In contrast to
general intellectual property rights setting the duration of protection, Article 9 considers TK
protection should last as long as the TK meets the criteria of eligibility for protection defined in
Article 4.137 Article 10 deals with transitional measures, which give fair treatment to third parties
who acquired TK in good faith before the implementation of the protection measures.138
According to Article 11, the formalities of protection are not required. Countries are allowed to
maintain a system of TK registers. Yet, the system should not prejudice undisclosed TK or the
interests of TK holders.139 Article 12, titled “Consistency with the General Legal Framework,”
requires that access to bio-diversity related knowledge be consistent with national laws
governing the matter.140
¶64
Article 13 mainly provides the content of competency for each national authority in order
to assist the administration and enforcement of such protection.141 The provision also mandates
that enforcement mechanisms “should be fair and equitable, [and] should be accessible[,]
[a]ppropriate and not burdensome for holders of traditional knowledge, and should provide
safeguards for legitimate third party interest and the public interest.”142
131

Id. at 20.
Id.
133
Id. at 22-23.
134
Id. at 24.
135
Id. at 27-32.
136
Id. at 33-34.
137
Id. at 35-36.
138
Id. at 37-38.
139
Id. at 39-40.
140
Id. at 41-42.
141
Id. at 44-45.
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Id. at 44.
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In terms of the status of national TK holders in foreign countries, Article 14 on
international and regional protection adopts the principle of national treatment. Consequently,
foreign TK holders enjoy no fewer benefits than those who are nationals of the country offering
protection.143
3. An Assessment of the WIPO Task

¶66

It may be fair to contend that the current WIPO/IGC draft is the most systematic
international instrument for TK protection, at least in terms of IP protection. It not only provides
lofty objectives and principles, but also a definite and well-structured legal foundation. If widely
accepted and implemented, it would to a certain degree promote TK protection on a global basis
and advance the rights and interests of TK holders as well. Not surprisingly, the WIPO has been
considered to be the appropriate forum for formulating relevant rules on TK protection.144
¶67
Although the IGC work has not yet been finalized, the influence of the draft over
international legislative progress cannot be underestimated. Indeed, several regional and national
processes have availed themselves of the draft WIPO provisions in developing and designing
their TK protection measures.145
¶68
In spite of the above accomplishment, it should be noted that the TK protection provided
by the draft instrument is a defensive mechanism in that it only applies to action against
misappropriation of TK.146 With respect to national practice, the Peruvian legislation represents
the leading practice of allowing TK holders, inter alia, to enjoy the right of protection against
unauthorized use, which echoes the WIPO’s approach.147
¶69
Further, certain deficiencies embodied in the WIPO work are evident. These provisions,
irrespective of WIPO’s well-organized structure, fall short of crystalline obligations upon States
given that the WIPO avoids using the term “shall” as much as possible.148 As a result, no definite
and strong commitments are established for States, and they still can maintain extensive
discretion and latitude in regulating TK protection. More importantly, the final form and status of

143

Id. at 47-49.
Weerawit Weeraworawit, International Legal Protection for Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore: Challenges for the Intellectual Property System, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 157, 164-65 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds. 2003).
145
IGC Twelfth Sess. Doc., supra note 116, ¶¶ 33-35 (pointing out how the CBD, Mongolia, the African Regional
Intellectual Property Organization and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have used part of the
draft as a reference to develop their agendas).
146
E.g. DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 349-51.
147
Peruvian Law N° 27811, supra note 52, arts. 42, 43. It should be noted that the WIPO document would not
prevent States from adopting a more positive approach for TK protection. Actually, positive protection had been
discussed at the WIPO forum. See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 338-39.
148
The term ‘shall’ is rarely applied. Arts. 1 and 9(2) are the only two instances; the wording ‘should’ or ‘may’ is
frequently used instead.
144
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the document has not yet been settled.149 It is observed that most WIPO members, either
developed or developing nations, now lack strong political will and momentum to take the task
in a serious manner.150 Accordingly, there is a high possibility that the instrument may turn out to
be similar to the voluntary Bonn Guidelines.
¶70
Of course, the IGC will continue to seek international consensus on TK protection with a
view to setting up a minimum standard. Even if the text may result in a binding instrument, the
inherent flaw of the WIPO that weakens its effectiveness, is the lack of a decent enforcement
mechanism.151
C. The WTO/TRIPS
¶71

The international protection of intellectual property rights should fall under the competence
of the WIPO. However, unsatisfied with the poor enforcement mechanism of the WIPO,
developed countries proposed an intellectual property rights agenda under the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations between 1986 and 1994. The final conclusion of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) within the WTO regime
represents the triumph of developed countries, led by the United States (U.S.), which had long
appealed for an effective and universal enforcement of intellectual property rights protection.152
Since then, the WTO has acquired parallel competence over intellectual property rights
protection, irrespective of the existence of the WIPO.
¶72
The present TRIPS context does not cover TK protection.153 TK draws the attention of the
WTO as a result of the CBD’s call for relevant international organizations, including the WTO,
to be aware about the impact of intellectual property rights policy on access and benefit-sharing
of genetic resources and associated knowledge.154 Developing countries have especially sensed
the gravity of the piracy and misappropriation of bio-diversity related TK, mostly occurring in
their territories.155 Since 1999, the TRIPS Council has accordingly begun to debate and review
the interrelationship between the TRIPS and the CBD.156

149

IGC Ninth Sess. Doc., supra note 112, ¶ 14 (outlining five possible options of binding or non-binding
arrangements. The latter covers declaration, recommendation, or guidelines).
150
DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 343.
151
See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 409 (3d ed. 2005).
152
Id. at 409-10.
153
See DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 344; Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Intellectual Property Protection after
TRIPS: An Asian Experience, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT FAIR? 71, 78
(Justin Malbon & Charles Lawson eds. 2008).
154
CBD, supra note 13, decision V/16, ¶ 14; V/26 B, ¶ 2 (inviting the WTO alike to deal with the relationship
between TRIPS and CBD).
155
UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 398 (2005).
156
See generally Sabrina Shaw and Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play, 36 J. WORLD
TRADE 129, 138-39 (2002).
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At its fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in November 2001, the WTO adopted the
Doha Development Agenda,157 in which the issue of TRIPS’ relation with the CBD (including
TK) continued to be included in the WTO new round negotiations. Paragraph 19 of the Doha
Development Agenda provides:
We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme including
under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to
paragraph 12 of this Declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between
the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection
of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments
raised by Members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS
Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8
of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development
dimension.158

Initially there had been different views on whether the WTO is the right forum for TK
negotiations. Developed countries had insisted that the WIPO/IGC is the more suitable forum. In
contrast, developing countries support the protection of TK through negotiations at the WTO,
partly due to the insufficient enforcement power of the WIPO.159 Currently, however, the WTO
has made no progress on positive TK protection.160
¶74
TK protection, however, has been negotiated under the context of the TRIPS-CBD
relationship since 2002. The central deliberations in the TRIPS Council have focused on the
proposals of many bio-resource-rich developing countries regarding the disclosure of origin,
which has also been a focal debate at the CBD and WIPO.161 They appeal the revision of the
TRIPS Agreement to add further disclosure obligations. The proposed amendment requires that
patent applicants shall provide, as a condition to acquiring patent rights, the following evidence:

157

The World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, The Fourth Ministerial
Conference, Doha, Nov. 9-14, 2001, The Doha Development Agenda, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M.
746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
158
Id. ¶ 19.
159
See generally UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 155, at 399.
160
Some are skeptical of the appropriateness of the WTO/TRIPS establishing new norms on positive TK protection.
DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 345. See also Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual
Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 149-59 (2005) (discussing whether these
proposed norms are adequate to deal with communally-held TK).
161
DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 17, at 342, 344.
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(i) disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource
and of the traditional knowledge used in the invention;
(ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities
under the relevant national regime; and
(iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the relevant
national regime.162

Developing countries contend that the disclosure requirements, if made mandatory, would be
useful to deter the undesirable grant of patents for inventions that misappropriate or illicitly
acquire bio-resources or associated TK.163 Further, such revision aims to ensure that TRIPS is
implemented in a manner supportive of the CBD objectives.164
¶75
Nonetheless, the proposal has met the strong opposition of some developed members. For
example, the U.S. consistently objects to the amendment. The U.S. argues that the requirement
would create an unnecessary burden upon national patent authorities,165 and that the more
effective means to curb bio-piracy is through solid enforcement of national ABS laws and
contract arrangements.166 Switzerland, although sympathetic to the concern raised by developing
countries, proposes the amendment of the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty as an alternative.167
¶76
Since the release of the disclosure proposal, both groups have been engaging in a very
heated debate.168 Given the significant controversy of the amendment and the persistent
opposition by developed world, especially the U.S., there seems to be no sign that the stalemate
will be solved in the near future or that the disclosure revision will reach consensus among WTO
members.169
162

Submission by Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela, The
Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403, ¶ 1 (June 24, 2003) [hereinafter Developing Countries,
IP/C/W/403] (emphasis in original), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm.
163
Id. ¶ 8.
164
Id. ¶ 3.
165
Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/434, ¶ 15 (Nov. 26, 2004).
166
Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/449, ¶¶ 19-21, 26, 39, 41
(June 10, 2005).
167
Communication from Switzerland, Review of Aricle 27.3(b), the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/400/Rev.1 (June 18, 2003).
168
Developing countries are represented by Brazil and India. The U.S. continues to play the major role in opposition
to the proposal. See generally Ni, supra note 15, at 449-52, 53.
169
In order to reach a compromise, Ni suggests that such a disclosure requirement could be of a discretional instead
of compulsory nature for WTO members. In effect, the discretion allows nations to decide whether patent applicants
are required to submit necessary information in this regard. While many developing countries have linked the grant
of patents to the compliance with their ABS laws, this approach ensures the consistency of such national laws with
TRIPS. Ni, supra note 15, at 457-58.
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If the developing countries’ proposal succeeds, the amendment would become obligatory
upon each WTO member, and national relevant IP laws must be revised accordingly. The
implementation of the mandate would be under the supervision of the TRIPS Council. The noncompliance of the presumed obligations would be subject to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism that provides a relatively effective procedure.170 Were such an amendment to pass,
TRIPS would mandate compulsory disclosure of TK origin and it would allow TK-hostingcountries who are WTO members to sue countries like the U.S. (also a WTO member) if U.S.
agents (such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) fail to require intellectual property rights
applicants to disclose the information. This would be a dispute between WTO members instead
of between indigenous groups and States. Of course, the local groups may pressure their hosting
countries to resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, not surprisingly,
developing countries are convinced that the WTO is the appropriate forum to effectively solve
the problem of the misappropriation of bioresources and related knowledge.
D. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:171 The Protection of TK Holders
from a Human Rights Perspective

¶78

Most TK holders are from indigenous communities. As TK holders constitute the most
important stakeholder in the context of TK protection, their TK rights should be fairly protected
and recognized.
¶79
The promotion and recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights have become important
international issues. In addition to the efforts of the International Labor Organization (ILO),172
the U.N., during the past several decades, has engaged in lawmaking to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples in many fora. For example, the discussion of issues pertaining to indigenous
peoples was initiated by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities under the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the
U.N. However, a serious deliberation of protecting indigenous peoples’ rights had not taken

170

See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
103-39 (2d ed. 2006). Disputes between WTO members are governed by “Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes,” of which Art. 23 is to be interpreted to grant the WTO exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes among members. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 124 (2d ed. 1999).
171
In addition to the U.N. lawmaking for the rights of indigenous peoples, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) had concluded two conventions for the protection of indigenous peoples: the 1957 Convention No. 107 and
the 1989 Convention No. 169. However, these treaties have not been widely ratified by countries with indigenous
populations. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 626.
172
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (I.L.O. No. 169), June 27, 1989,
28 I. L.M.S 1382 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
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place until the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a sub-organ under the
Sub-Commission, in 1982.173
¶80
The mandate of the Working Group aims to: (i) annually review recent developments
pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous peoples, and (ii) develop international standards regarding the human rights of
indigenous peoples.174 Following a resolution of the Sub-Commission stating that a special
instrument, in the form of a declaration, was needed, the Working Group first formulated certain
generally agreed-upon principles. Over time, it eventually completed the draft Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993.175
¶81
In accordance with a resolution of the Commission on Human Rights,176 the draft had been
further developed during eleven sessions between 1995 and 2006. The newly established Human
Rights Council finally approved the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples on June 29, 2006177 and recommended it to the General Assembly for adoption. Given
the opposition by countries with large indigenous peoples to the declaration,178 the Third
Committee of the General Assembly in November of 2006 voted to defer further action on the
declaration.179 Eventually, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on September 13,
2007.180
¶82
The U.N. instrument contains several provisions upholding the rights of indigenous peoples
on TK. Article 11 recognizes the rights of the peoples to maintain, protect and develop the past,
present, and future manifestations of their cultures.181 With respect to the remedy for
misappropriation of their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property, States are

173

See XANTHAKI , supra note 8, at 102-03.
E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, 1st Regular Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1982/82, at 26-27 (May 7, 1982).
175
E.S.C. Rep. of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Its FortySixth Sess., Aug. 1-26, 1994, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994).
176
Commission on Human Rights Res. 1995/32, 51st Sess., E/CN.4/RES/1995/32 (Mar. 3, 1995).
177
Human Rights Council Res. 2006/2 (June 29, 2006), Working group of the Commission on Human Rights to
elaborate a draft declaration in accordance with paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution 49/214 of 23
December 1994, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., A/HRC/RES/2006/2 (June 29, 2006),
http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/INT000000021.pdf. Adopted by a recorded vote of 30 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. See
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
178
The U.S. then joined Australia and New Zealand to strongly criticize the declaration. Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 101 AM J. INT’L L. 212 (2007).
179
Press Release, Third Committee, Third Committee Approves Draft Resolution on Right to Development; Votes
to Defer Action Concerning Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3878 (Nov. 28, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gashc3878.doc.htm (last visisted May 10, 2007).
180
See U.N. Declaration, supra note 16.
181
Id. art. 11(1).
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required to provide an effective mechanism.182 This mandate coincides with the WIPO’s TK
instrument, which focuses on legal protection against misappropriation.183
¶83
More importantly, Article 31 explicitly recognizes their right to TK in the context of
cultural development, including intellectual property rights to TK:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, . . .
They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional
cultural expressions.184
Furthermore, the declaration demands that States, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take
effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of the rights listed in the declaration.185
In contrast to previous international instruments concerning the duty of States regarding TK
protection, this provision seems to send a relatively strong message to States hosting indigenous
peoples.
¶84
This instrument also declares certain rights that are relevant to the preservation of TK as a
whole. Article 25 recognizes the distinct relationship between indigenous peoples and their
traditionally owned or occupied lands, territories, and resources.186 Additionally, their right to
own, use, develop, and control these areas has been affirmed.187 Article 29 bestows upon
indigenous peoples the right to conserve and protect the environment.188 As mentioned above,
these rights to some extent have been incorporated into the current CBD lawmaking process in
Article 8(j).189
¶85
The declaration, irrespective of its adoption and possible influence, is not legally binding.
But, multilateral declarations are able to generate a variety of lawmaking effects, which can be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.190 It has been observed that the degree of support for a
declaration matters.191 In effect, a consensus declaration or a unanimous adoption amounts to a
sign of strong expectations of compliance.192 By contrast, “[d]issenting minorities may
182

Id. art. 11(2).
See WIPO DRAFT, TK Objectives and Principles, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2, 7, 13.
184
U.N. Declaration, supra note 16, art. 31(1) (emphasis added).
185
Id. art. 31(2).
186
Id. art. 25.
187
Id. art. 26.
188
Id. art. 29.
189
U.N. Environment Programme, supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
190
They may constitute evidence of existing law, or of the opinion juris necessary for new law, or of the practice of
states. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 31.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 32.
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undermine the authority and lawmaking significance of a resolution, particularly if they comprise
states most affected.”193 Indeed, the U.N. declaration was not approved by consensus or by
unanimous vote. The four negative votes on the Declaration thus may presumably have a
significant diminishing effect. Nonetheless, indicating that those objecting States actually
accepted core principles and values of the Declaration during the debates and negotiations,
Wiessner argues that “the four states in opposition to the Declaration have demonstrated an
opinio juris—a willingness to be bound if all of the provisions were formulated to agree with
their detailed policy preference.”194
¶86
The instrument has actually become so dynamic and influential as to shape States’ behavior
and policy.195 It can be expected that the U.N. articulation may create further impetus for States
to protect the rights of indigenous peoples regarding TK.
¶87
It is worth noting that the Declaration tends to strengthen its implementation and
effectiveness by requesting the U.N. system, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues (UNPFII),196 and States to promote respect for and full application of the content of the
Declaration.197 Literally speaking, the UNPFII would be competent to monitor and supervise the
progress and compliance of the Declaration.198 It remains to be seen how far and to what extent
each nation would implement the U.N. mandate, and how seriously the U.N. regime may ensure
the effectiveness and observance of the rules.
IV. DO WE NEED A SINGLE FORUM TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?
¶88

The above study indicates the active and diverse global lawmaking on TK. The
development of course will continue to evolve and progress. The proliferation of international
TK lawmaking reflects the broad spectrum of TK, including, inter alia, the concern of nature
193

Id.
Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1165 and n.153 (2008).
195
It is shown that the adoption of the Declaration has influenced many countries’ statutes or policies on indigenous
affairs, such as those of the Philippines and some Latin American countries. Id. at 1162. The U.S., Canada, New
Zealand and Australia recently have shifted their original positions so as to support the U.N. Declaration. Moreover,
Bolivia has passed a law (No. 3760) to incorporate the declaration. See INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, http://www.iwgia.org/sw37643.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
196
The U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) serves an advisory role to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council, providing advice and reports concerning indigenous affairs while the Council is in session. About
Us/Mandate, UN PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); Background Information, U.N.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/ecosoc/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
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U.N. Declaration, supra note 16, art. 42.
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For a discussion of the role of the UNPFII in serving as a monitoring mechanism, see Viniyanka Prasad, The
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of
Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 297, 314-15 (2008).
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conservation, cultural expression, intellectual property and the protection and recognition of
indigenous peoples’ rights. Usually a multilateral lawmaking process on the same subject matter
may generate incoherent or even conflicting normative implications. Drahos points out that
multiple international efforts to protect TK and the application of a variety of norms to TK
protections that are already being enacted at state level would make TK regulations lose
coherence and produce a clash of cultures, legal approaches, and enforcement strategies.199 In
order to avoid such circumstances, the international community should promote harmony and
coherence amongst the regimes at stake.
¶89
The CBD appears to be the most dynamic global institution on the protection of TK. The
CBD currently focuses on building an ABS international regime that would cover the
enforcement of genetic resource-associated TK. The newly adopted Nagoya Protocol reflects the
determination of the CBD Parties to eliminate bio-piracy and misappropriation of such genetic
resources and associated knowledge. Overall, the lawmaking has been an international
movement to consolidate and enhance the efforts in combating the illegal monopoly of such
items, and to ensure that genetic resources and TK holders may benefit from the
commercialization of these valuable objects. In spite of the promising effort, the CBD
arrangement has its own limitations. The CBD, by its mandate, cannot govern the protection of
TK beyond the bio-diversity related sphere and accordingly lacks expertise and competence to
effectively address TK-related intellectual property rights. Without the cooperation of the U.S.
(which has long been blamed for bio-related piracy) especially, the future international regime on
ABS hardly can thoroughly redress the violation of provider parties’ national law concerning the
preservation of bio-related TK. Because the U.S. is not a party to the CBD, the treaty body
would be incapable of monitoring the U.S. patent policy concerning TK.
¶90
The property and commercial orientation of the WIPO and WTO probably make them
insufficient instruments in terms of governing TK protection. Also, it remains uncertain whether
the U.N. Indigenous Forum can effectively supervise and enforce its TK mandate.
¶91
Indeed, TK is not the only cross-cutting issue facing the international community. For
instance, as noted by Boyle and Chinkin, there have been a variety of U.N. bodies governing the
development of forest-related rules,200 and “no single forum is self-evidently the right one to
undertake the development of new laws.”201 Given the limitation embodied in the present TK
lawmaking regimes, similar to the forest scenario, no single forum currently proves to be
available and competent to manage TK thoroughly.
199

Drahos, supra note 3, at 414.
BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 117 (including FAO, International Tropical Timber Organization, The
World Heritage Convention adopted UNESCO, Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP, and Convention on
Climate Change, etc).
201
Id.
200
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¶92

Ideally, the international community needs a coherent and integrated instrument or
institution on TK to formulate binding rules and effective enforcement mechanisms. The diverse
merits of TK make it difficult to decide which single international institution or treaty body, and
in what form, should govern the matter. Drahos proposes the establishment of a Global BioCollecting Society (GBS) regime to co-ordinate multiple international institutions, and argues the
agenda of enforcement should be placed as the first priority.202 Yet, the question remains
unsettled as to which international institution should be in charge of the matter.
¶93
Constructing a single institution on TK lawmaking would likely not be realistic in the near
future. Nevertheless, in light of the lawmaking process of those institutions mentioned above, it
is worth noting that, the U.N.-related institutions (CBD, WIPO, and U.N. Human Rights’
mechanisms) to some extent have already been engaging in harmonization of lawmaking
activities. Not only do they have cross-culture dialogue203 and cooperation,204 but they are also
seeking mutual incorporation and integration in the TK context (see Figure 1 below for a graphic
representation of this concept). The constant sharing of common values could alleviate the
adverse effect of fragmentation of international TK lawmaking and help promote coherence
among these regimes. Certainly, trans-institutional cooperation and mutual supportiveness for
TK protection among the relevant international TK instruments will be essential as the respective
TK instruments become operative and mature in the future.
¶94
Figure 1: The Mutual Integration of Components among TK Regimes

CBD

ABS

Not clear
yet

Human
Rights
Approach

PIC: UN Declaration

Rights of TK holders

UN IP Declaration
(UNPFII)

WIPO
Misappropriation of TK: UN Declaration

202

Drahos, supra note 3, at 412-15.
OGUAMANAM, supra note 1, at 191-222 (observing the cross-cultural dialogue between the CBD and WIPO).
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See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 628, n.214 (noting the close cooperation between the CBD and the UNPFII).
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V. CONCLUSION
¶95

¶96

¶97

¶98

¶99

¶100

The protection of TK is no longer a matter of national context. Rather, there has been a
growing international movement to structure TK in a more normative form. Of course, the
lawmaking process of relevant international legal regimes is still ongoing. Presently, it remains
premature to predict the eventual outcome. Given the largely soft law character of most
international instruments on TK, it seems far from clear whether States may seriously conform to
the rules. The effect of those “laws” may be even less prominent, especially when a powerful
mechanism to supervise or monitor the national enforcement of TK mandates is still scant. Yet,
the adoption of a binding ABS by the CBD may make things different.
The uncertain international legal status of those TK holders, mainly indigenous peoples,
would leave the protection of TK to the discretion of each State. Indeed, the ABS Protocol of the
CBD, if run successfully, would uphold the protection of biodiversity-related TK and preserve
the interest of indigenous and local groups holding such TK. Its effectiveness is nevertheless
confined to matters of ABS regarding associated TK.
The significance of the WIPO document on TK protection cannot be overemphasized. The
work can be deemed as international consensus to protect TK from the perspective of a defensive
approach. However, as indicated, it would not be possible to make the document legally binding,
partly because the expressions used in the draft have indicated that it may turn out to be a form
of voluntary guidelines.
The WTO agreements, including the TRIPS, are the most mandatory of the current
international regimes. Their enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms are also relatively
effective. The current Doha Round Negotiations, however, do not create a particular agenda for
TK protection. There has also been strong resistance against the approach to add the CBD
elements into the disclosure requirement for patent applications. It is thus highly unlikely that the
WTO may actively contribute to the protection of TK at the present stage.
Most of current TK lawmaking remains in a preliminary stage and the proposed documents
are largely of soft law character. However, their draft form and non-binding nature, such as the
WIPO and U.N. instruments, do not prevent them from providing useful reference for national
TK legislation. It is also predictable that the elaboration and finalization of these TK instruments
may help promote and enhance the awareness and political will to engage in domestic TK lawand policy-making. It may thus be premature to cast a definite judgment on the achievement of
the current international lawmaking on TK. Whether the movement would be a useful vehicle or
just an empty box awaits further assessment.
On the other hand, the proliferation of global TK lawmaking reveals a potential
contradiction amongst relevant international norms. To enhance mutual supportiveness and to
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avoid conflict, it is highly desirable to articulate a mechanism to harmonize and reconcile those
lawmaking vehicles. While the formation of a single comprehensive international institution for
the development of TK law probably remains remote or unrealistic, the present and continuous
harmonization among TK lawmaking mechanisms proves to be essential and must be
strengthened.
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Annex I: The Current Status of International Legal Instruments on the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge
Int’l Institutions The Legal Status of
Instruments
CBD

Compliance
Mechanism

Dispute
Settlement

Art. 8(j): binding but weak Weak

Weak

Code of Ethical Conduct:
Non-binding

N/A

N/A

Bonn Guidelines: Nonbinding

N/A

N/A

Int’l Regime on Access
To be developed
and Benefit-sharing:
under the Protocol
Nagoya Protocol is
binding upon effectiveness

N/A

WIPO

Draft Provisions for the
Protection of Traditional
Knowledge:
uncertain (binding or nonbinding to be negotiated)

N/A

N/A

WTO/TRIPS

The Proposal to amend the Yes
disclosure requirement for
patent application:
binding if the revision
becomes mandatory

Yes

United Nations/
General
Assembly/
UNPFII

The UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples:
Non-binding but with
potential influence

N/A
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To be developed
under UNPFII

